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Abstract
Visual scene recognition is a dynamic process through which incoming sensory information is iteratively compared with
predictions regarding the most likely identity of the input stimulus. In this study, we used a novel progressive unfolding task
to characterize the accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to scene recognition, and its potential modulation by the
emotional valence of these scenes. Our results show that emotional (pleasant and unpleasant) scenes led to slower
accumulation of evidence compared to neutral scenes. In addition, when controlling for the potential contribution of non-
emotional factors (i.e., familiarity and complexity of the pictures), our results confirm a reliable shift in the accumulation of
evidence for pleasant relative to neutral and unpleasant scenes, suggesting a valence-specific effect. These findings indicate
that proactive iterations between sensory processing and top-down predictions during scene recognition are reliably
influenced by the rapidly extracted (positive) emotional valence of the visual stimuli. We interpret these findings in
accordance with the notion of a genuine positivity offset during emotional scene recognition.
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Introduction
Visual object recognition has classically been conceived as
resulting from a set of serial computations performed by dedicated
ventral object-selective brain regions located in the infero-
temporal cortex, eventually enabling to progressively extract the
precise meaning of the retinal input [1,2]. Whereas bottom-up
processes are typically emphasized in these hierarchical models,
the visual computations performed by these object-selective areas
are nonetheless susceptible to top-down modulatory effects,
including selective attention [3–6], prior expectations [7,8],
contextual information [9,10], or decision-making [11,12].
Therefore, visual object recognition processes are not limited to
the analysis of sensory information, but they are further shaped by
higher order (i.e., not strictly perceptual) processes.
Interestingly, an alternative view has been put forward to
account for these complex interaction effects between bottom-up
sensory processing and top-down modulatory influences during
recognition. Namely, predictive coding models [13–21] advocate
that visual object recognition processes taking place within the
infero-temporal cortex result from the dynamic interplay between
(top-down) predictions and (bottom-up) errors [22]. Predictions
reflect prior knowledge related to probable events in the sensory
environment, and they are employed to reduce the computational
burden of visual perception by guiding attention towards salient
aspects of the environment, as well as facilitating the interpretation
of ambiguous visual input [7]. Whenever a discrepancy is detected
between these top-down predictions and bottom-up sensory
processing, an error signal (prediction error) is generated and
propagated back to higher-level brain regions, with the aim to
update or refine the content of the predictions, and in turn
accommodate online sensory processing with the current specific-
ities carried by the visual input [14,19,21,23]. In this framework,
the expected and actual sensory input are dynamically compared
at each stage of processing by means of recursive loops, until the
system is able to generate the most likely interpretation of the
target object [7,24].
Of note, asymmetries in speed of processing and visual
pathways between low spatial frequency (LSF) and high spatial
frequency (HSF) information could potentially provide a mecha-
nistic account to explain predictive coding effects during early
stages of recognition of single objects and complex visual scenes
[25]. Several studies have already established the differential
contribution of LSF vs. HSF input in face recognition [26–28], as
well as in the processing of complex visual scenes [29–32]. More
precisely, LSF information seems more useful in identifying the
gist of the scene in conditions of fast stimulus presentation (i.e.,
30 ms), whereas for longer durations (150 ms) observers rely more
on HSF information [30]. Interestingly, because LSF information
travels rapidly from early sensory visual areas to prefrontal and
anterior temporal regions (via magnocellular projections), this
early coarse analysis of the visual input might actually serve to
generate predictions about its content [10,33–36].
Nonetheless, all the models reviewed so far have dealt with the
processing of neutral visual stimuli, exclusively. Hence, the
question remains whether, when encountering emotion-laden
objects or scenes, perceptual processes underlying these proactive
guesses are comparable to those involved during the processing of
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neutral stimuli or not. In fact, given the accumulating empirical
evidence showing that emotion does not simply add a specific
flavor to perception but can have profound influences in stimulus
processing, both at the behavioral and neural levels [37–42], one
can argue that predictive coding during visual scene recognition
may reliably be influenced by emotional factors. However, this
question has received little empirical support, and it is therefore
still unclear whether mechanisms of predictive coding may change
during visual scene recognition or not, depending on the extracted
emotional content or value of the incoming stimulus. To address
this issue, we recently developed and validated a new experimental
paradigm. It enables us to study effects of emotion (i.e., valence
and/or arousal) on the speed of proactive guesses during scene
recognition, both at the behavioral and electrophysiological (event-
related brain potentials, ERPs) levels [43]. For each individual
trial, participants were presented with series of filtered images that
were gradually unfolding the content of a complex visual scene
while they had to perform an (orthogonal) animacy judgment task.
Each trial began with the presentation of a blurred image, whose
content was progressively revealed by increasing, in up to six
sequential, parametric and predictive steps, the amount of
diagnostic LSF and HSF information. Therefore, this procedure
mimicked a ‘‘coarse-to-fine’’ accumulation of perceptual evidence
[30,33,44–46]. Importantly, the visual scenes used in this study
(extracted from a standard database) could be neutral, pleasant or
unpleasant, based on independent arousal and valence ratings
obtained for these visual stimuli. Behavioral results confirmed that
this task was suited to study predictive coding effects during scene
recognition because participants did not respond randomly, but
they accumulated sufficient perceptual evidence before deciding,
with high accuracy, whether the content of the scene was living or
not [11,47–49]. Importantly, this effect was not identical for the
three emotion categories. Participants probably accumulated
perceptual evidence less rapidly (reflected in prolonged recogni-
tion) for emotional compared to neutral scenes, this effect being
most obvious for pictures having a pleasant content. These results
could be interpreted as reflecting a negativity bias during scene
recognition [50,51]. Negativity bias refers to the fact that aversive
stimuli usually elicit stronger responses compared to appetitive
ones, leading in turn to a faster recognition for unpleasant relative
to pleasant pictures. However, the prolonged exploration for
pleasant scenes was also consistent with the concurrent activation
of positivity offset during scene recognition [52,53]. In this view,
when input to the affect system is minimal, positivity may
outweigh negativity. Due to their intrinsic hedonistic value,
pleasant scenes could therefore be associated with prolonged
exploration. Hence, behavioral results of this study [43] were
equivocal with regard to the underlying emotional or motivational
drive accounting for these findings.
Whereas these results shed light on mechanisms underlying the
generation of proactive guesses during scene recognition and how
emotion may influence these complex processes, a main question
also arose regarding the specificity of these effects. For instance,
considering the fact that we used an orthogonal task (i.e., animacy
judgment), it is conceivable that the emotional content of the scene
had little or no direct impact on the expression of processes
involved in accumulation of perceptual evidence [54–57].
Moreover, it was unclear from these results alone whether
emotion as such, or other non-controlled factors, may actually
have produced the change in the rate of accumulation of evidence
between emotional and neutral scenes. Presumably, the selected
visual scenes did not differ only regarding the actual emotional
content, but also their intrinsic picture complexity and/or
familiarity, even though we took special care to minimize obvious
perceptual and structural differences across the three emotion
categories [43]. However, if the neutral vs. emotional scenes
selected in our study were not properly balanced along these two
specific non-emotional dimensions (i.e., picture complexity and
familiarity), we cannot exclude the possibility that the reported
behavioral effects may be imputed to these factors, rather than the
differential processing of the emotional content during scene
recognition. Presumably, more complex or less familiar visual
scenes might be associated with delayed accumulation of evidence
in our task. Hence the question remains whether the prolonged
accumulation of evidence found in our study for emotional relative
to neutral scenes may (at least partly) be explained by changes in
picture complexity and/or familiarity across the three emotion
categories, rather than the emotional content per se [43].
Therefore, the goal of the present study was to assess whether
trial-by-trial variations along these two dimensions may overshad-
ow or confound genuine effects of emotion during the accumu-
lation of perceptual evidence prior to scene recognition or not.
We referred to picture complexity as the extent to which a
target object in the foreground can be easily segregated from its
background [58]. Figure-ground segregation is a fundamental
process in visual scene recognition [59–61]. Following initial
sensory registration of contours, the visual system automatically
groups regions adjacent to each contour with either the main
figure in the foreground or the background, thereby prioritizing, in
the subsequent analysis, all regions grouped with the figure [62].
However, despite the ubiquitous importance of this gestalt
mechanism in vision, previous research has found only weak
correlations between picture complexity (e.g., figure-ground
segregation) and visual emotion processing [32,58,63,64]. As a
matter of fact, motivationally relevant stimuli, particularly
emotional scenes, usually influence late perceptual or even post-
perceptual stages of processing, presumably after earlier mecha-
nisms contributing to figure-ground segregation come into play
[65,66]. However, all these studies used (relatively) brief and static
presentations of fully detailed neutral vs. emotional stimuli,
therefore strongly limiting the online generation of predictions
about the actual identity of the incoming visual input. Therefore,
these earlier studies did not allow to titrate the potential influence
of picture complexity on the accumulation of evidence leading to
(emotion) scene recognition. We predicted that, in our experiment,
picture complexity might actually influence accumulation of
evidence, indicated by slower accumulation rates for pictures
characterized by a more complex, as opposed to less complex
content (i.e., a less vs. a more obvious figure-ground segregation).
Familiarity, on the other hand, was defined as the frequency of
encounter associated with a given stimulus (picture content),
following standard practice [67]. Familiarity is a relevant construct
to take into account in the present case, given its potential overlap
with emotion processes. In fact, novelty has been found to elicit
threat-like cardiovascular responses in social situations involving
the violation of stereotypical expectations [68]. Moreover, a
comparable startle reflex was observed for novel and emotional
pictures [69]. These negative evaluations of novel/unfamiliar
stimuli could be due to the difficulty with which individuals extract
diagnostic information necessary for a quick and efficient
recognition [70]. Specifically, high fluency (i.e., enhanced
processing facilitation) is accompanied by an increase of positive
affective reactions, as evidenced by more positive judgments of
neutral pictures presented for a prolonged period of time [71].
This effect could potentially explain well-known psychological
phenomena such as ‘‘mere-exposure’’, that is people’s general
tendency to prefer stimuli they are repeatedly exposed to [72–74].
Accordingly, it is important to establish whether familiarity, rather
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than emotion (i.e., valence and/or arousal), may account for
changes in accumulation of evidence prior to recognition. Given
the evidence reviewed here above, we predicted more familiar
scenes to be recognized earlier than less familiar scenes in our
experiment.
To address these questions, we designed a new experiment
based on the previously validated progressive unfolding task [43]
and collected data in a sample of healthy adult participants.
Noteworthy, in addition to the main memory matching task (old-
new judgment; see below), we instructed participants to directly
attend to the emotional content of the stimuli by occasionally
asking them to rate the emotional valence of the scenes. These
instructions are at variance with the animacy judgment task used
in our previous study [43]. We reasoned that this manipulation
should augment the relevance of emotional features during the
task [54], and hence the likelihood to observe reliable differences
between the three emotion categories (neutral, pleasant and
unpleasant) during accumulation of evidence prior to scene
recognition. Furthermore, each and every scene used during the
main experiment was subsequently rated in terms of familiarity
and picture complexity by two independent samples of partici-
pants, using standard 9-point Likert scales. Afterwards, we used
these independent ratings in a single-trial analysis to assess
whether systematic changes in accumulation of evidence prior to
recognition (as measured in the main progressive unfolding
experiment) might be confounded by variations along picture
complexity and/or familiarity. More specifically, we assessed
whether the prolonged exploration for emotional compared to
neutral scenes (see results) might be due to systematic changes in
picture complexity and/or familiarity across these categories.
Methods
Ethics statement
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty
of Psychological and Educational Sciences, Ghent University. All
participants were required to give written informed consent prior
to their participation.
Participants
Eighteen psychology students (all women, mean age 21 years,
range 18–26) participated in the main experiment (progressive
unfolding task) in exchange of 30J. In addition, 20 volunteers (15
women, mean age 23 years, range 18–34) participated in the
picture complexity rating experiment, whereas another sample of
21 participants (17 women, mean age 23 years, range 19–37)
completed the familiarity rating experiment. Each participant of
the two rating experiments received 8J. All individuals were
native Dutch speaking, right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, with no history of neurological or psychiatric
disorders.
Stimuli
The visual stimuli were selected from the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS) [75], a standard database containing
neutral and emotionally-evocative pictures depicting objects and
scenes across various ecological situations. This database provides
normative ratings for the basic dimensions of emotion – including
arousal and valence – using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM)
[76]. The stimulus list consisted of 360 pictures, equally divided
into three emotion categories according to their standardized
valence scores: neutral, unpleasant and pleasant (Table 1).
Notably, these pictures were selected on the basis of mean valence
and arousal ratings reported by female responders [75], because
only women eventually participated in the main experiment (see
above). Since the main purpose was to assess valence-specific
effects during scene recognition, the selected pleasant and
unpleasant scenes were properly balanced with regard to levels
of arousal (see Table 1). Similarly to our previous study [43],
highly pleasant (i.e., erotic situations) or highly unpleasant (i.e.,
mutilations) scenes were not included in the stimulus set, given the
specific emotion responses often associated with these two
categories [65,77]. Moreover, we included 16 additional neutral
pictures that were only used during the practice session (therefore
not considered in the subsequent statistical analyses). Finally, 36
supplementary neutral scenes were scrambled (i.e., each picture
was divided into grids of 2556255 pixels, which were randomly
shuffled 10 times), thereby disrupting the content of the scene.
Thus, a total of 412 IAPS pictures (including practice and
scrambled trials) were shown to participants of the main
experiment, while participants of the two rating experiments were
presented with the 360 main pictures (excluding practice and
scrambled scenes).
Number codes of pictures selected from the database [75] are
provided, for each category separately. Practice: 2107, 2600, 2980,
5533, 5731, 6837, 7017, 7030, 7036, 7055, 7057, 7140, 7224,
7365, 8121, 8312. Neutral: 1350, 1616, 1675, 1903, 1935, 1947,
2025, 2026, 2034, 2191, 2272, 2273, 2279, 2308, 2357, 2377,
2382, 2383, 2390, 2396, 2445, 2446, 2489, 2495, 2514, 2575,
2579, 2593, 2595, 2597, 2606, 2702, 2720, 2749, 2850, 2880,
4090, 4150, 4220, 4250, 4255, 4274, 4275, 4320, 4325, 4605,
4750, 5040, 5395, 5500, 5531, 5532, 5534, 5535, 5900, 6570.2,
7001, 7002, 7003, 7009, 7011, 7014, 7016, 7018, 7019, 7021,
7032, 7033, 7037, 7038, 7042, 7043, 7044, 7045, 7058, 7061,
7062, 7081, 7096, 7130, 7160, 7161, 7170, 7180, 7184, 7186,
7188, 7190, 7207, 7236, 7242, 7247, 7248, 7249, 7255, 7287,
7300, 7354, 7484, 7487, 7493, 7500, 7503, 7506, 7512, 7513,
7546, 7547, 7550, 7590, 7595, 7710, 7820, 7830, 8241, 8311,
8325, 9210, 9260, 9700. Unpleasant: 1230, 1240, 1270, 1275,
1280, 1390, 1505, 1617, 1945, 2115, 2130, 2141, 2205, 2276,
2278, 2400, 2455, 2456, 2525, 2681, 2682, 2694, 2695, 2700,
2715, 2716, 2718, 2745.2, 2750, 2752, 2770, 2795, 2799, 2810,
2900.1, 3061, 3160, 3181, 3190, 3210, 3216, 3280, 3300, 3301,
4621, 4635, 4770, 5970, 5973, 6000, 6240, 6241, 6311, 6314,
6561, 6562, 6610, 6800, 6832, 7013, 7023, 7079, 7092, 7136,
7137, 7520, 7521, 8231, 9002, 9005, 9008, 9031, 9041, 9045,
9046, 9080, 9090, 9102, 9145, 9171, 9180, 9182, 9186, 9265,
9270, 9290, 9291, 9295, 9320, 9330, 9331, 9341, 9342, 9390,
Table 1. Mean values and standard deviations (in
parenthesis) of normative valence and arousal scores for the
selected IAPS pictures.
Emotion category Valence Arousal
Neutral 5.14 (1.38) 3.68 (2.05)
Unpleasant 3.17 (1.61) 4.94 (2.15)
Pleasant 6.95 (1.70) 4.97 (2.30)
Note. Scores range from 1 to 9. Independent samples t-test confirmed a highly
significant difference in valence between neutral and unpleasant [t(119) = 29.34,
p,.001], neutral and pleasant [t(119) =226.82, p,.001] and unpleasant and
pleasant [t(119) =252.58, p,.001] scenes. Significant differences were also
observed in levels of arousal, specifically between neutral and unpleasant
[t(119) =229.34, p,.001] and neutral and pleasant [t(119) =230.98, p,.001]
pictures. However, no significant arousal difference was evidenced between
unpleasant and pleasant scenes [t(119) =20.77, p = .441], confirming a
balanced level of activation between these two emotion conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038064.t001
Valence-Specific Modulation in Scene Recognition
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e38064
9395, 9402, 9404, 9411, 9415, 9417, 9419, 9421, 9435, 9440,
9445, 9469, 9471, 9561, 9584, 9592, 9596, 9635.2, 9830, 9831,
9832, 9912, 9913, 9922, 9926, 9927. Pleasant: 1340, 1463, 1540,
1590, 1595, 1640, 1659, 1660, 1720, 1721, 1811, 1999, 2055.2,
2056, 2092, 2151, 2156, 2158, 2224, 2274, 2300, 2331, 2344,
2346, 2352, 2398, 2605, 2616, 2655, 3005.2, 4500, 4530, 4534,
4536, 4559, 4571, 4600, 4601, 4603, 4606, 4610, 4612, 4614,
4616, 4617, 4619, 4623, 4624, 4641, 5199, 5215, 5260, 5301,
5480, 5600, 5622, 5628, 5660, 5700, 5814, 5829, 5831, 5849,
5990, 5994, 6250.2, 7200, 7230, 7250, 7260, 7279, 7281, 7282,
7286, 7289, 7291, 7350, 7352, 7390, 7400, 7410, 7430, 7440,
7460, 7461, 7470, 7477, 7481, 7482, 7488, 7489, 7492, 7496,
7501, 7505, 7508, 7515, 7570, 8032, 8050, 8118, 8120, 8162,
8208, 8220, 8280, 8340, 8350, 8371, 8420, 8460, 8461, 8465,
8467, 8497, 8503, 8510, 8531, 8540, 8620; Scrambled: 1112,
1303, 1310, 1645, 1726, 1908, 2002, 2018, 2032, 2038, 2101,
2102, 2104, 2122, 2190, 2220, 2221, 2393, 2440, 2441, 2458,
2480, 2484, 2493, 2506, 2512, 2516, 2518, 2570, 2580, 2635,
2704, 2780, 2830, 2840, 9070.
Each neutral, unpleasant and pleasant scene was arbitrarily
paired with another one from the same emotion category based on
low-level visual similarities, assessed by systematic visual inspec-
tion. More specifically, for each emotion category separately,
pictures with a clear distinction between a central figure and a
homogeneous background were paired together (e.g., a coffee mug
on a table vs. a pocket watch on a dark background), and the same
strategy was applied for more complex scenes (e.g., a traffic jam vs.
a woman in the crowd). These pairs were used during the main
task to minimize the use of purely perceptual, pixel-to-pixel
matching strategies (see here below). All the pairs created with this
procedure are reported in Table 2.
The selected IAPS scenes were resized to 9226691 pixels (90%
of the original size) and pre-processed similarly to our previous
study [43]: after grayscale conversion, six bandpass spatial
frequency filters were applied on every picture (using ImageJ
v1.44 software; http://rsb.info.nih.gov/ij/) [78]. As a result, six
distinct levels of filtering were obtained for every IAPS scene, each
containing a different amount of low and high spatial frequency
information [43]. All these modified pictures were finally resized to
7686576 pixels (75% of the original IAPS pictures).
Procedure
Participants were individually tested in a small, dimly lit room,
and seated at a viewing distance of 75 cm in front of a 190 CRT
computer screen (refresh rate: 100 Hz). After filling out the
informed consent, they were presented with task instructions,
followed by a practice block containing 16 neutral pictures. Then,
they moved on to the experimental session, divided into twelve
blocks, each containing 33 trials. Each trial had the following
structure. A colorful, fully detailed picture (9226691 pixels,
subtending 18.5u613.9u of visual angle) was first presented on
the screen for 1500 ms, followed by a grayscale mask displayed for
2000 ms. Then, the actual unfolding sequence [43] began. A
fixation cross appeared in the center of the screen for 250 ms. The
first grayscale, blurred image level of a given picture (7686576
pixels, 15.4u611.6u) was then presented for 500 ms, followed by a
250 ms blank screen. Next, the second image level of the same
picture (identical pixel size, but containing slightly more HSF and
LSF information) was displayed for 500 ms, plus the 250 ms blank
screen, and the same procedure was repeated until the presenta-
tion of the sixth, non-filtered image level. The inter-trial interval
was constant and set at 1000 ms (Figure 1A). This experimental
manipulation was used to promote a gradual and predictive
accumulation of perceptual evidence by progressively adding, in a
stepwise fashion, high and low spatial frequency information to the
first undistinguishable picture [43]. Importantly, the grayscale and
resize conversions relative to the original colorful scene (presented
at the beginning of each trial) were applied to discourage
participants to use a pixel-to-pixel matching strategy to perform
the task. Two separate and consecutive responses were required.
First, participants were asked to press a button on a response box
(Cedrus RB-730; http://www.cedrus.com/responsepads/rb730.
htm) with their right index finger as soon as they felt they
gathered enough perceptual evidence to decide, with sufficient
confidence, whether the content of the unfolded scene was either
the same as the one displayed at the beginning of the trial, a new
one, or a new scrambled picture (Response1). These scrambled
pictures, for which a separate response was required (see below),
were used as ‘‘catch’’ trials to ensure that participants reliably
attended to the content of the scenes. Pressing the button
immediately interrupted the presentation of the stimulus sequence.
After 500 ms, participants were required to perform a three-
alternative forced choice delayed matching task, in order to
validate their first response (Response1). Specifically, they had to
press, on a standard AZERTY keyboard, the ‘‘O’’ key if the
unfolded scene was the same as the colorful one previously
presented (‘‘old’’ condition), the ‘‘N’’ key if these two scenes were
different (‘‘new’’ condition), or the ‘‘S’’ key if the unfolded scene
was displaying a meaningless content (‘‘scrambled’’ condition). All
these responses, for which no time constraint was established, were
coded as Response2. The main purpose of this dual response
procedure was to dissociate early visual detection (Response1)
from the overt discrimination of the scene requiring a specific
stimulus-response mapping (Response2) [43]. Participants were
asked to focus on accuracy, but at the same time they were
encouraged not to wait until the end of the unfolding sequence to
decide about the content of the visual scene (Response1).
Responses1 occurring after the presentation of the last/sixth
image level were therefore classified as late responses and analyzed
separately.
To promote the use of abstract visual representations during
overt scene recognition, another experimental manipulation was
applied besides the aforementioned inclusion of scrambled pictures
as ‘‘catch’’ trials. Specifically, half of the ‘‘old’’ scenes (i.e.,
unfolded pictures that were identical to the previously encountered
colorful scenes) were unpredictably flipped along the horizontal
axis between encoding (colorful picture) and retrieval (unfolding).
Participants were informed that an ‘‘old’’ response was expected
for these ‘‘flipped’’ pictures, since the main task required them to
focus on the content of each scene to perform the matching task.
In the subsequent behavioral analyses, ‘‘old flipped’’ and ‘‘old
unflipped’’ trials were combined into a single ‘‘old’’ condition, to
be compared to ‘‘new’’ trials. In sum, for each emotion category
(neutral, pleasant, unpleasant), two trial types were contrasted:
‘‘old’’ (N= 180), in which the identity of the initial colorful picture
was identical to the scene progressively unfolded, and ‘‘new’’
(N= 180), meaning that the identities of the colorful and unfolded
scene were different (although matched as far as possible in terms
of low level visual properties using specific stimulus pairs; see the
Stimuli section). Hence, for ‘‘new’’ scenes, we used the pairs
previously created (see Table 2), with one picture of the pair used
as colorful image (encoding) and the other used during unfolding
(counterbalanced across participants). We created several stimulus
lists such that, across participants, each picture appeared equally
often in the ‘‘new’’ and ‘‘old’’ conditions. Importantly, for ‘‘new’’
scenes, no change in terms of emotional content ever occurred
between the colorful picture and the scene gradually revealed
during unfolding. Accordingly, a neutral colorful picture was
Valence-Specific Modulation in Scene Recognition
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Table 2. Stimulus pairs created for the progressive unfolding task.
Image pairs
Pair Unpleasant Pleasant
First element Second element First element Second element First element Second element
1 2191 7513 2455 9180 1640 7286
2 2272 7500 2525 9635.2 1660 4641
3 2308 4250 3300 2752 2158 2156
4 2357 8311 5970 2694 2274 8208
5 2382 7242 5973 9912 2605 7291
6 2390 5535 6000 2115 2616 2300
7 2514 7061 6241 6832 4530 4500
8 2575 2273 6610 6800 4600 2398
9 2579 2595 7013 9926 4616 4610
10 2606 7037 7079 9041 4619 7260
11 2880 7493 7136 9186 4624 7410
12 4090 7003 7137 7092 5260 7440
13 5040 7161 8231 9440 5622 8620
14 5900 6570.2 9080 2715 5831 2056
15 7009 7190 9102 6314 5849 5628
16 7011 4320 9171 2718 5990 7496
17 7014 2377 9182 2456 5994 8120
18 7021 7248 9265 9031 6250.2 8032
19 7038 5532 9290 9320 7200 8510
20 7042 2034 9291 9342 7279 7489
21 7044 7130 9330 9832 7430 7352
22 7045 2396 9395 3181 7460 5480
23 7062 7186 9415 9471 7477 8465
24 7207 7032 9417 6561 7482 8540
25 7287 2026 9421 2900.1 7501 7505
26 7484 7096 9435 7520 7508 5199
27 7503 1350 9584 9469 7570 5814
28 7590 2850 9592 9270 8460 8497
29 7830 7546 9596 2205 8461 2352
30 9260 4275 9831 9402 8503 7470
31 1616 2445 1270 1275 1340 8420
32 1675 2593 1230 2799 1463 8280
33 1903 7255 1240 1617 1540 1595
34 1947 5531 1280 9830 1590 1720
35 2025 7506 1390 2745 1721 8340
36 2446 2383 1505 9002 2224 4606
37 2489 1935 1945 9419 2331 8350
38 2495 2702 2130 9045 2344 1811
39 2720 7033 2141 9090 3005.2 4571
40 2749 4325 2276 2681 4536 2346
41 4150 2597 2682 2795 4559 2055.2
42 4274 7160 2695 9404 4601 7282
43 4750 4255 2716 2700 4603 8162
44 5534 7547 2810 9913 4612 2151
45 7018 9210 3061 6311 4614 7488
46 7019 7300 3160 9005 4617 2092
47 7043 7016 3190 7521 4623 7481
48 7081 7001 3210 6240 5301 8531
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always followed by the unfolding of a neutral scene, and the same
occurred for emotion-laden stimuli (pleasant-pleasant; unpleasant-
unpleasant; see also Table 2). The order of ‘‘old’’, ‘‘new’’ and
‘‘scrambled’’ trials was randomized.
Finally, in order to verify whether the emotional content of the
selected IAPS pictures was actually perceived as such and in line with
the normative ratings [75], as well as to keep the emotional content
task-relevant throughout the experiment, participants were occasion-
ally asked, after the registration of Response2, to also rate the
emotional valence of the colorful scene presented at the beginning of
each trial by means of a standard 9-point SAM [76], with anchor 1
corresponding to ‘‘very unpleasant’’ and anchor 9 to ‘‘very pleasant’’.
This additional emotion classification task concerned 10% of the total
number of trials. Such manipulation was also employed to increase
the likelihood to detect reliable differences between emotional and
neutral scenes during accumulation of evidence prior to scene
recognition because, with these specific task demands, participants
had to attend to the emotional content of the scene [54,55].
Stimulus presentation and behavioral response recordings were
controlled using E-Prime 2.0. (http://www.pstnet.com/products/
e-prime/).
Rating experiments
Participants were tested in pairs in a dimly lit room, seated at a
viewing distance of 75 cm in front of individual 190 CRT screens. In
each pair, one member was assigned to rate familiarity while the
other was asked to focus on picture complexity of the pre-selected
IAPS scenes. After completing the informed consent, they were
presented with task instructions, including examples. Then, they
moved on to the experimental session, divided into six blocks of 60
trials, separated by short breaks. After an initial fixation cross
displayed for 500 ms, neutral, pleasant and unpleasant colorful
pictures (hence corresponding to the picture presented at the
beginning of each trial of the main progressive unfolding experiment)
were presented on the screen in randomized order for 2000 ms.
Participants were asked to ignore the hedonic valence of the scenes
and provide either familiarity or picture complexity ratings (depend-
ing on the condition they were assigned to) using 9-point Likert scales.
In case of familiarity judgments, the question was: ‘‘How often have
you encountered a scene like the one depicted in the picture?’’. Scores
ranged from 1 (never) to 9 (very often). Raters judging picture
complexity, on the other hand, were presented with the question:
‘‘Do you consider this picture as having a homogeneous background
and an obvious central figure or do you perceive it as more ‘noisy?’’’,
with ‘‘clear figure-ground’’ anchoring the lower end of the scale and
‘‘complex scene’’ anchoring the upper end. The visual stimuli were
never displayed on the screen during the rating phase.
E-Prime 2.0 was used for stimulus presentation and response
recordings.
Analysis of behavioral data
One-way ANOVAs and post-hoc t-tests were used to verify that
the emotional content of the scenes was perceived by our
participants in agreement with the normative ratings, as well as
to explore differences between neutral, unpleasant and pleasant
pictures in terms of familiarity and picture complexity.
Accuracy on the progressive unfolding task was expressed as
percentage of correct responses. Moments of recognition (Respons-
es1) across the six image levels were not independent of each other:
in fact, perceptual evidence was gradually accumulating based on
visual input provided by previous image levels. Therefore,
cumulative percentages were calculated. This procedure resulted
in six psychometric curves showing the evolution of recognition
performance across the six image levels, separately for each memory
(old, new) and emotion (neutral, unpleasant, pleasant) condition. To
characterize effects of emotion and memory on recognition
performance, we used a proportional odds model with memory
and emotion as predictors [79]. This complex model provides a
regression analysis for ordinal dependent variables (recognition
from image level 1,…, recognition from image level 6). This data
analysis, performed at the single-trial level, allows to model the
cumulative probability up to and including recognition from each
image level k (k = 1, …, 5). The derived odds ratio expresses how
much the odds of recognition from image level k or earlier is
increased (if larger than 1) or decreased (if smaller than 1) across
new, old, neutral and emotional (unpleasant and pleasant) contents,
and thus provides a single number capturing the shift in
psychometric curve. To account for dependencies of trials within
Table 2. Cont.
Image pairs
Pair Unpleasant Pleasant
First element Second element First element Second element First element Second element
49 7170 7002 3216 4770 5600 7350
50 7180 4605 3280 6562 5660 5215
51 7184 7236 4635 9008 7230 1999
52 7188 7820 9445 9927 7250 7461
53 7247 7249 2278 9295 7281 2655
54 7354 7058 2400 9145 7390 5700
55 7487 8325 2770 9341 7492 5829
56 7512 2279 9390 7023 7515 8467
57 7550 4220 9922 9561 8050 4534
58 7595 5395 9046 4621 8118 1659
59 7710 5500 2750 9411 8220 7289
60 8241 9700 3301 9331 8371 7400
Note. These numbers refer to picture codes, as available in the original database [75].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038064.t002
Valence-Specific Modulation in Scene Recognition
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e38064
Figure 1. Trial presentation and results of the emotional classification task. (A) Main trial types during the progressive unfolding
experiment. A colorful neutral, unpleasant or pleasant IAPS scene (not shown here for copyright reasons) was first presented for 1500 ms, in random
order. Following a 2000 ms uniform mask, the same scene (45%), a new one (45%), or a scrambled picture (10%) was progressively revealed in
grayscale, using six successive steps varying in a monotonic fashion regarding the content of LSF and HSF information. Each image level was
presented for 500 ms, followed by a 250 ms blank screen. Participants had to press a pre-defined button as soon as they could decide whether the
gradually unfolded scene was the one seen at the beginning of the trial, a new one, or a scrambled picture (Response1). Five hundred milliseconds
after Response1, participants validated their choice and indicated whether the scene was ‘‘old’’, ‘‘new’’ or ‘‘scrambled’’ by pressing one out of three
buttons (Response2). (B) Results of the emotion classification task (occurring after Response2 on 10% of the trials) showed higher scores
(corresponding to more pleasant pictures) for pleasant scenes (white bar), followed by neutral (light grey bar) and unpleasant (dark grey bar) scenes.
*** p,.001. Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038064.g001
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the same subject, a multi-level version of the proportional odds
model was used, similarly to our previous study [43].
Next, we included the mean scores (averaged across raters) of
familiarity and picture complexity obtained for each individual
picture as additional predictors in the proportional odds model.
We verified whether any effect of emotion and/or memory on
recognition performance obtained during the main progressive
unfolding experiment could be explained by a concurrent effect of
familiarity and/or picture complexity.
The level of significance for all these analyses was set at p,0.05.
To control for Type I error, a conservative Bonferroni correction
was applied to each of the six pairwise comparisons of interest (i.e.,
emotion, 3 levels; memory, 2 levels) evaluated in each statistical
model for the accuracy.
Results
Emotion classification task during the progressive
unfolding experiment
Results showed higher ratings for pleasant scenes (M=6.14,
SD=0.81), followed by neutral (M=4.89, SD=0.58) and unpleasant
(M=3.45, SD=1.06) pictures. A one-way ANOVA on these ratings
disclosed a highly significant effect of emotion [F(2, 34) =39.94,
p,.001, gp
2= .701]. Post-hoc t-tests confirmed highly significant
differences between neutral and unpleasant pictures [t(17) =4.83,
p,.001], as well as between neutral and pleasant [t(17) =27.47,
p,.001] and unpleasant and pleasant [t(17) =26.81, p,.001] scenes
(Figure 1B). These results confirmed that participants perceived and
identified the emotional content of the pre-selected stimuli in
accordance with the published normative ratings [75].
Accuracy for the progressive unfolding experiment
The percentage of errors remained low in this task (M=3.66%,
SD=1.85). Likewise, very few errors were committed with
‘‘catch’’ trials (M=1.75%, SD=1.90). In addition, the percentage
of late responses (Responses1 occurring after the last/sixth image
level) was negligible (M=1.71%, SD=1.18), providing additional
evidence that participants accurately performed the matching task
during the gradual stimulus revelation and did not wait until the
presentation of the last, fully detailed image level to stop the
stimulus sequence (Response1).
Table 3 shows the cumulative percentages of correct responses
(i.e., Responses1 only when Responses2 were correct). A mixed
proportional odds model [43,79] with memory (old, new) and
emotion (neutral, unpleasant, pleasant) as fixed factors, and
participant as random effect was carried out on these values, to
verify whether the obtained psychometric curves shifted as a function
of memory and/or emotion (Figure 2A and 2B). This analysis
revealed, as expected, an overall earlier recognition for old compared
to new scenes in all emotion conditions (all ps,.001). More
interestingly, pairwise comparisons revealed a shift of the distribution
as a function of the emotional content of the scenes. Specifically, an
earlier recognition (i.e., less accumulation of evidence) was observed
when the picture contained a neutral as opposed to an emotional
content (all ps,.01), with no significant difference between pleasant
and unpleasant scenes (all ps..05) (see Table 4). The interaction
between these two effects (memory and emotion) showed a trend
towards significance (p= .064), indicating that the observed delay in
recognition for emotional compared to neutral scenes was slightly
more pronounced for old relative to new scenes.
Rating experiments
Familiarity ratings of the pre-selected IAPS pictures revealed
lower scores for unpleasant scenes (M=3.48, SD=0.98), followed
by neutral (M=4.87, SD=0.89) and pleasant (M=4.93,
SD=1.05) scenes. A one-way ANOVA on these values disclosed
a highly significant effect of emotion [F(2, 40) = 58.64, p,.001,
gp
2 = .746]. Post-hoc t-tests showed significant differences between
unpleasant and neutral [t(20) =28.51, p,.001], as well as
unpleasant and pleasant [t(20) =27.70, p,.001] scenes
(Figure 3A). Mean familiarity was similar for pleasant and neutral
scenes [t(20) =20.78, p = .445].
Results of picture complexity ratings, on the other hand, showed
higher scores for unpleasant (M=4.70, SD=0.81), relative to
neutral (M=4.13, SD=0.64) and pleasant (M=4.16, SD=0.74)
pictures. A one-way ANOVA carried out on these ratings revealed
a highly significant effect of emotion [F(2, 38) = 16.12, p,.001,
gp
2 = .459]. Pairwise comparisons confirmed significant differenc-
es between unpleasant and neutral [t(19) = 4.19, p,.001] and
unpleasant and pleasant [t(19) = 5.87, p,.001] scenes (Figure 3B),
whereas no difference was observed between pleasant and neutral
scenes [t(19) =20.28, p = .779]. Thus, unpleasant pictures were
characterized by lower familiarity and higher picture complexity
compared to neutral and pleasant scenes.
Familiarity and picture complexity were found to be anti-
correlated, as confirmed by a significant negative correlation
[Pearson’s r(360) =20.40, p,.001].
Accuracy for progressive unfolding experiment when
controlling for familiarity and picture complexity of the
visual scenes
Next, we included the average familiarity and picture complex-
ity ratings, obtained for each visual scene separately, as concurrent
Table 3. Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of cumulative percentages of correct responses, separately for each
image level, emotion and memory condition.
New Old
Image Level Neutral Unpleasant Pleasant Neutral Unpleasant Pleasant
Image1 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Image2 0.10 (0.41) 0.19 (0.79) 0.00 (0.00) 1.22 (2.42) 0.46 (0.00) 0.19 (0.79)
Image3 5.01 (5.36) 3.28 (3.57) 2.35 (3.00) 13.12 (10.40) 10.26 (9.77) 7.55 (8.98)
Image4 38.88 (17.72) 32.07 (17.19) 33.40 (18.24) 56.93 (19.28) 51.62 (16.48) 49.61 (17.68)
Image5 85.66 (14.51) 77.94 (15.87) 81.38 (14.05) 90.98 (8.55) 87.95 (8.70) 87.85 (9.40)
Image6 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038064.t003
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predictors in the proportional odds model, in order to statistically
assess whether the significant effects of memory (i.e., prolonged
explorations for new relative to old scenes) and emotion (i.e.,
prolonged explorations for emotional relative to neutral scenes)
might be confounded by trial-to-trial fluctuations along these non-
emotional dimensions.
Main effects of familiarity and picture complexity were
significant (all ps,.001), indicating earlier recognition for more
familiar and less complex pictures, in line with our predictions.
However, and crucially, the analysis revealed that, after having
modeled the potential contribution of these two factors (Table 5),
pleasant scenes in the new condition were still associated with a
delayed recognition relative to neutral pictures (p = .006) (see also
Figure 4A). Pleasant scenes were also recognized later compared to
unpleasant pictures (p = .034). However, this difference was no
longer considered significant after correction for multiple com-
parisons (see Table 5). Interestingly, the difference between neutral
and unpleasant scenes was no longer significant in this analysis
(p = .621), suggesting that familiarity and picture complexity might
have accounted for the difference between neutral and emotional
Figure 2. Accuracy in the main progressive unfolding task. Cumulative percentage of correct Responses1 as a function of the six image levels,
in the (A) new and (B) old condition, separately for neutral (solid line), unpleasant (dashed line) and pleasant (dotted line) scenes. The shape and
variation of the psychometric function according to the main experimental factors (memory and emotion) confirmed that: (i) participants gathered
perceptual evidence prior to recognition; (ii) they had a significantly earlier recognition (i.e., less perceptual evidence needed) for old compared to
new scenes. Moreover, for each of these two memory levels, emotional scenes led to a delayed recognition relative to neutral scenes. Vertical bars
correspond to standard errors of the means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038064.g002
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scenes in our first analysis (see Table 4). A very similar statistical
outcome was observed for old scenes: pleasant pictures led to a
prolonged recognition compared to either neutral (p,.001) or
unpleasant (p,.001) scenes (see also Figure 4B), whereas the
difference between neutral and unpleasant pictures was no longer
significant (p = .671). Importantly, the interaction effect between
emotion and memory was not significant (p = .102), indicating that
the delay in recognition for pleasant scenes was comparable in the
new and old conditions. The shift found for pleasant relative to
neutral scenes before correcting for complexity and familiarity (see
Figure 2) did not therefore appear to be related exclusively to these
two specific factors (unlike the case of unpleasant scenes), because
the refined analysis controlling for variations along these factors
still confirmed this shift (Figure 4).
In order to assess whether familiarity and picture complexity had
different influences on accumulation of evidence processes in our
experiment, we next modeled recognition performance separately
for familiarity and picture complexity. Including effects of
familiarity in the model (Table 5) revealed, in the new condition,
a significantly delayed recognition for pleasant relative to neutral
scenes (p = .002). The difference between pleasant and unpleasant
scenes (p = .179), and between unpleasant and neutral scenes
(p = .092) were not significant. In the old condition, pleasant scenes
were also recognized reliably later compared to neutral (p,.001)
and unpleasant (p = .001) ones, whereas the difference between
unpleasant and neutral scenes was not significant (p = .228).
When modeling the specific contribution of picture complexity
(Table 5), the analysis revealed, in the new condition, a delayed
recognition for pleasant relative to neutral scenes (p = .006),
whereas the unpleasant vs. neutral comparison was not significant
(p = .939). The difference between recognition of pleasant vs.
unpleasant pictures (p = .008) was marginally significant after
Bonferroni correction. The analysis of recognition performance in
the old condition revealed that pleasant scenes were recognized
significantly later relative to neutral (p,.001) and unpleasant
(p,.001) scenes, whereas the difference between unpleasant and
neutral scenes was not significant (p = .901).
Although these analyses led to the same conclusions, it is
interesting to note that – based on the standard Akaike
information criterion (AIC) [80] – the model including both
familiarity and picture complexity was providing the best statistical
fit. More specifically, the AIC was 13488 for the model including
only familiarity, 12619 for the model with only picture complexity,
and 12615 for the model with both factors. Since a lower AIC
value is considered to fit the data better [80], these results suggest
that familiarity explained some of the variability over and beyond
picture complexity, the inclusion of this latter factor providing a
better fit than the former.
Discussion
The aim of our study was twofold: (i) to investigate whether the
emotional valence of complex visual scenes could have an impact
on the accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to their
recognition, in line with previous findings showing a delayed
recognition (i.e., prolonged accumulation of evidence) for emo-
tional compared to neutral stimuli [43]; (ii) to verify whether these
effects may be explained by trial-to-trial fluctuations along other
non-emotional variables, with a focus on familiarity and picture
complexity.
We used a progressive unfolding task that proved to be useful to
explore accumulation of evidence processes prior to scene
recognition [43]. After a standard picture encoding phase,
participants were presented with series of filtered images that
were progressively unfolding the same picture content, a new one
or a scrambled one relative to encoding, and the task was to decide
whether this scene had previously been presented or not (delayed-
match-to-sample task). Of note, the content of either the same
scene or a new one was progressively revealed by adding up, in a
non-linear fashion, LSF and HSF information, providing a
‘‘coarse-to-fine’’ temporal decomposition of the visual stimulus
[45,46,81]. We reasoned that the use of impoverished LSF
information (and HSF information to a lesser extent), largely
predominating at the beginning of the unfolding sequence, could
foster the generation of proactive guesses about the actual identity
of the scene progressively revealed [10,33,35].
Results showed a delayed recognition for new compared to old
scenes, as well as for emotional relative to neutral pictures,
consistent with our previous results [43]. While the former
memory effect confirms that participants used abstract visual
representations stored in short-term memory to perform the task
[82,83], the latter effect indicates that these predictive coding
mechanisms during scene recognition were not immune to the
rapidly perceived emotional content of the input stimulus.
Specifically, pleasant and unpleasant scenes were associated with
a delayed recognition relative to neutral pictures, suggesting an
emotion-specific modulation of predictive coding effects during
scene recognition. Moreover, this systematic time lag for
recognizing emotional scenes was similar in the new and old
conditions, suggesting a general effect taking place irrespective of
the memory status of the perceived scenes.
However, we also found that familiarity and picture complexity
each had a substantial influence on accumulation of evidence
processes prior to scene recognition. First, results of the additional
rating experiments showed that the selected unpleasant scenes
were rated as less familiar than either neutral or pleasant scenes
(Figure 3A), consistent with previous work [69,71]. This result is in
line with the well-known ‘‘mere-repeated-exposure’’ phenomenon
[72–74], showing that human beings tend to develop a preference
towards objects deemed familiar. Therefore, unpleasant objects or
events that are typically avoided are considered as less familiar,
exactly as found in our rating experiment. Second, our results
showed that unpleasant pictures were also considered to be
perceptually more complex compared to either neutral or pleasant
scenes (Figure 3B). More specifically, unpleasant scenes were
systematically associated with a less evident figure-ground
segregation in the auxiliary rating experiment, an effect which
might lead to a decreased fluency to process these scenes and
hence confer them a negative valence [70,71]. Thus, based on the
Table 4. Results of the mixed proportional odds model.
Memory
condition Comparison
Odds ratio
(95% CI) p-value
pleasant vs. neutral 0.75 (0.63,0.90) 0.003*
New pleasant vs. unpleasant 1.11 (0.92,1.33) 0.246
unpleasant vs. neutral 0.67 (0.56,0.81) ,0.001*
pleasant vs. neutral 0.65 (0.53,0.77) ,0.001*
Old pleasant vs. unpleasant 0.84 (0.71,1.01) 0.064
unpleasant vs. neutral 0.76 (0.64,0.91) 0.006*
Note. An odds ratio larger than 1 (smaller than 1, respectively) implies that the
probability of recognition at earlier levels is higher (smaller, respectively) for the
first vs. the second condition included in the comparison. CI indicates
confidence interval.
*indicates significant difference after Bonferroni correction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038064.t004
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lower familiarity and higher picture complexity scores obtained for
the unpleasant relative to the neutral and pleasant scenes selected
in our study, one would predict a change in the speed of
accumulation of perceptual evidence for this specific class of
emotional stimuli, when compared to the two other conditions.
Likewise, given the balanced mean ratings for pleasant and neutral
scenes, one could anticipate that accumulation of perceptual
evidence would be similar for these two conditions. Instead, our
single-trial analysis, in which we included familiarity and
complexity ratings – obtained for each and every scene separately
– as concurrent regressors (in addition to emotion and memory),
revealed that pleasant scenes were associated with a distinctive
delayed accumulation of evidence relative to the two other
conditions, regardless of the memory status (old vs. new) and hence
presumably ease of recognition of these scenes. Thus, at first sight,
familiarity and complexity ratings alone could not account for the
shift obtained for pleasant relative to neutral scenes during the
main task. These results provide evidence for the contribution of
positivity offset during emotion scene recognition [53,84–86]. This
concept refers to the fact that, when inputs to the affect system are
minimal, positivity outweighs negativity. As a consequence,
organisms may engage in exploratory behavior under conditions
Figure 3. Familiarity and picture complexity ratings. Mean (A) familiarity and (B) picture complexity ratings, separately for neutral (dark grey
bar), unpleasant (light grey bar) and pleasant (white bar) scenes. On average, unpleasant scenes were rated as less familiar and perceptually more
complex (i.e., less obvious figure-ground segregation) relative to either neutral or pleasant scenes. *** p,.001. Vertical bars correspond to standard
errors of the means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038064.g003
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in which no immediate threat is detected, with the aim to gain
knowledge about novel stimuli in the environment and their
potential value, an effect that is usually exacerbated for pleasant/
positive compared to neutral or unpleasant stimuli [53]. Accord-
ingly, the results of our study show that participants were prone to
gather additional evidence about pictures carrying intrinsic
reinforcing hedonistic values (in this case, pleasant pictures),
probably because these pictures better matched their actual
motivational dispositions. This latter observation also suggests that
the influence of positive emotion on perception in our task was
probably operating at an abstract level of stimulus representation,
before or after specific short-term memory traces came into play.
Of note, a prolonged exploration for pleasant relative to neutral or
unpleasant scenes in our experiment may alternatively be
explained by the differential motivational relevance of this specific
emotion stimulus category [53,84,87–89]. This general account
appears unlikely though, because we did not observe any gain or
change during accumulation of evidence for unpleasant compared
to neutral scenes, despite the obvious motivational and/or
evolutionary relevance of these negative stimuli [50,51].
The prolonged accumulation of evidence for pleasant relative to
neutral and unpleasant scenes may stem from an increase in the
number of actual iterations made between updated predictions
(initially shaped or constrained by the encoding of the scene in
short-term memory) and the progressively accumulated degraded
sensory evidence during unfolding, with the aim to minimize
prediction errors and favor the most likely interpretation
concerning the actual identity of the scene [14,24,90,91].
Alternatively, rather than a quantitative change in the ratio
between predictions and errors during accumulation of perceptual
evidence, the processing of pleasant scenes may be associated with
an overall shift in the decision criterion, relative to neutral or
unpleasant scenes. In this view, accumulation of sensory evidence
would occur equally fast for neutral and unpleasant scenes, but the
delayed decision-making process for pleasant scenes would
primarily stem from an enhanced competition between (two or
more) choices or alternatives at the decision level per se. The use of
computational modeling, and more specifically diffusion models,
might turn out to be valuable in this context to tease apart these
two accounts [11,48,92,93]. According to these models, decision-
making is achieved after having accumulated sufficient sensory
evidence, and eventually gathered information in favor of one out
of two (or more) alternatives, hence reaching a decision threshold
[47–49]. The speed of accumulation of perceptual evidence (also
termed drift rate) heavily depends on the strength of the sensory
signal, as well as the signal-to-noise ratio. Thus, the aforemen-
tioned computational models provide useful hints to better explain
how specific dispositions to engage in exploratory or approach-
related behavior in non-threatening environments (i.e., positivity
offset) may ultimately influence proactive processes leading to
perceptual decision-making. Further studies are needed to assess
whether the processing of pleasant scenes is accompanied by a
change in the drift rate compared to neutral or unpleasant scenes,
or whether genuine post-perceptual processes may account for this
emotion effect. Likewise, additional neuroimaging and/or neuro-
physiological studies might help clarify whether accumulation of
evidence processes are actually generic but vary in speed –
depending on the emotional content of the input stimulus – or,
instead, several non-overlapping accumulation of evidence brain
process may co-exist and can be activated predominantly
depending on the valence of this input stimulus.
We have to acknowledge some limitations related to our
experimental design and specific data analysis. Familiarity and
visual complexity ratings of the pre-selected scenes were collected
from two independent samples of participants, while another
sample of participants completed the unfolding experiment. It
would probably have been more optimal, from a statistical point of
view, to use a full within-subject design. However, we did not want
to create any bias or expectation regarding the content of the
pictures that were progressively revealed during the main
experiment. Therefore, we could not ask the same participants
to rate the pre-selected visual scenes along the familiarity and
picture complexity dimensions before the unfolding experiment.
Conversely, ratings obtained for these stimuli would probably be
influenced by prior exposure and unbalanced explorations during
the unfolding experiment, as revealed for pleasant relative to
neutral and unpleasant scenes in our study. Another limitation lies
in the possible specificity of these effects for women, because we
included mainly female participants and a differential processing
of the emotional content of visual stimuli for men and women has
previously been reported [94–96]. However, the pictures were
carefully selected according to the normative ratings published in
the manual for this specific gender [75]. Moreover, we purpose-
fully decided not to include highly arousing pictures (e.g.,
mutilations or erotica) in our stimulus set, because these extreme
pictures were found to elicit the largest differences between male
and female participants in previous research [65,77].
To sum up, the results of our study show that accumulation of
evidence prior to scene recognition is substantially influenced by
the perceived emotional content of the visual stimulus. More
Table 5. Results of the alternative mixed proportional odds model, once item-specific values along familiarity and picture
complexity were included in the model.
Familiarity and picture
complexity Familiarity alone Picture complexity alone
Memory condition Comparison Odds ratio (95% CI) p-value Odds ratio (95% CI) p-value Odds ratio (95% CI) p-value
New pleasant vs. neutral 0.76 (0.63,0.91) 0.006* 0.74 (0.62,0.88) 0.002* 0.76 (0.63,0.91) 0.006*
pleasant vs. unpleasant 0.80 (0.65,0.98) 0.034 0.88 (0.72,1.07) 0.179 0.76 (0.63,0.92) 0.008
unpleasant vs. neutral 0.95 (0.78,1.17) 0.621 0.84 (0.69,1.03) 0.092 0.99 (0.81,1.20) 0.939
Old pleasant vs. neutral 0.62 (0.51,0.74) ,0.001* 0.63 (0.52,0.76) ,0.001* 0.62 (0.51,0.74) ,0.001*
pleasant vs. unpleasant 0.64 (0.53,0.78) ,0.001* 0.71 (0.58,0.86) 0.001* 0.61 (0.50,0.73) ,0.001*
unpleasant vs. neutral 0.96 (0.79,1.16) 0.671 0.89 (0.74,1.08) 0.228 1.01 (0.84,1.22) 0.901
Note.
*: significant difference after Bonferroni correction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038064.t005
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specifically, emotional scenes were associated with a prolonged
accumulation of evidence relative to neutral scenes. Controlling
for non-emotional dimensions (i.e., familiarity and picture
complexity) further revealed a delayed recognition for pleasant
compared to unpleasant and neutral scenes, suggesting a valence-
specific influence on the speed of proactive guesses prior to
perceptual decision-making. More generally, these findings are
consistent with a positivity offset during complex scene recogni-
tion. The propensity to dwell longer on pleasant compared to
neutral or unpleasant scenes may be explained by a change in the
ratio between predictions and errors during accumulation of
evidence, while participants actively make guesses and computed
online the most probable interpretation regarding the identity of
the incoming and progressively unfolded visual scene. Finally,
Figure 4. Accuracy in the main progressive unfolding task, adjusted for non-emotional factors. Cumulative percentage of correct
Responses1 as a function of the six image levels, in the (A) new and (B) old condition, separately for neutral (solid line), unpleasant (dashed line) and
pleasant (dotted line) scenes, once these values were adjusted for familiarity and picture complexity. A significant shift of the psychometric function
(corresponding to prolonged accumulation of evidence) was observed for pleasant compared to either neutral or unpleasant scenes, regardless of
memory (old vs. new). No significant difference was found between neutral and unpleasant scenes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038064.g004
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given the evidence showing a strong positivity offset during
emotional scene recognition (that cannot easily be accounted for
by systematic trial-to-trial fluctuations along familiarity or picture
complexity), we believe that this specific experimental paradigm
and stimulus set may eventually turn out to be valuable to shed
light on possible qualitative alterations during visual emotion
perception typically observed in specific psychopathological
conditions. For example, this task appears useful to explore
possible changes between the expression of positivity offset vs.
negativity bias during scene or object recognition, a modification
that might characterize exploration strategies preferentially used
by depressed or high anxious individuals [97,98].
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